The design and implementation of an

Moreover, Layer 2 switches deliver the ability to increase bandwidth to the wiring closet without adding unnecessary complexity to the network. At Layer 2, no modification is required to the frame content when going between Layer 1 interfaces, such as Fast Ethernet to 10 Gigabit Ethernet.

The design and implementation of an

Long-Term Unlinkability The browser MUST provide an obvious, easy way for the user to remove all of its authentication tokens and browser state and obtain a fresh identity.

Additionally, the browser SHOULD clear linkable state by default automatically upon browser restart, except at user option. Philosophy In addition to the above design requirements, the technology decisions about Tor Browser are also guided by some philosophical positions about technology.

Preserve existing user model The existing way that the user expects to use a browser must be preserved. If the user has to maintain a different mental model of how the sites they are using behave depending on tab, browser state, or anything else that would not normally be what they experience in their default browser, the user will inevitably be confused.

They will make mistakes and reduce their privacy as a result. Worse, they may just stop using the browser, assuming it is broken.

University Medical Center New Orleans

User model breakage was one of the failures of Torbutton: Even if users managed to install everything properly, the toggle model was too hard for the average user to understand, especially in the face of accumulating tabs from multiple states crossed with the current Tor-state of the browser.

Favor the implementation mechanism least likely to break sites In general, we try to find solutions to privacy issues that will not induce site breakage, though this is not always possible.

Plugins must be restricted Even if plugins always properly used the browser proxy settings which none of them do and could not be induced to bypass them which all of them canthe activities of closed-source plugins are very difficult to audit and control.

They can obtain and transmit all manner of system information to websites, often have their own identifier storage for tracking users, and also contribute to fingerprinting. If the user agent allows the user to craft an exemption to allow a plugin to be used automatically, it must only apply to the top level URL bar domain, and not to all sites, to reduce cross-origin fingerprinting linkability.

Each option that detectably alters browser behavior can be used as a fingerprinting tool. Similarly, all extensions should be disabled in the mode except as an opt-in basis. Instead of global browser privacy options, privacy decisions should be made per URL bar origin to eliminate the possibility of linkability between domains.

For example, when a plugin object or a JavaScript access of window. The same goes for exemptions to third party cookie policy, geolocation, and any other privacy permissions. If the user has indicated they wish to record local history storage, these permissions can be written to disk. Otherwise, they should remain memory-only.

The design and implementation of an

We believe that these addons do not add any real privacy to a proper implementation of the above privacy requirementsand that development efforts should be focused on general solutions that prevent tracking by all third parties, rather than a list of specific URLs or hosts.

There is still just a list containing specific URLs and hosts which, in this case, are assembled by Disconnect and adapted by Mozilla. Trying to resort to filter methods based on machine learning does not solve the problem either: Filter-based solutions in general can also introduce strange breakage and cause usability nightmares.

For instance, there is a trend to observe that websites start detecting filer extensions and block access to content on them. Coping with this fallout easily leads to just whitelisting the affected domains, hoping that this helps, defeating the purpose of the filter in the first place.

Filters will also fail to do their job if an adversary simply registers a new domain or creates a new URL path.

The Design and Implementation of Probabilistic Programming Languages

Worse still, the unique filter sets that each user creates or installs will provide a wealth of fingerprinting targets. As a general matter, we are also generally opposed to shipping an always-on Ad blocker with Tor Browser. We feel that this would damage our credibility in terms of demonstrating that we are providing privacy through a sound design alone, as well as damage the acceptance of Tor users by sites that support themselves through advertising revenue.

Users are free to install these addons if they wish, but doing so is not recommended, as it will alter the browser request fingerprint.Disclaimer: The examples and resources highlighted on these pages have been gathered for educational purposes.

BGP Design and Implementation

CAST does not necessarily endorse the products listed, nor does their inclusion here mean that these products are complete expressions of the UDL principles and guidelines.

They may. IPC Releases New IPC/PERM, Pb-free Design and Assembly Implementation Guide IPC-PERM addresses the impact of Pb-free on reliability and service life for aerospace, defense and high-performance products. PPDIOO Lifecycle Approach to Network Design and Implementation. PPDIOO stands for Prepare, Plan, Design, Implement, Operate, and Optimize.

PPDIOO is a Cisco methodology that defines the continuous life-cycle of services required for a network. The Tor Browser Design Requirements are meant to describe the properties of a Private Browsing Mode that defends against both network and local forensic adversaries.

The security requirements are primarily concerned with ensuring the safe use of Tor. Violations in these properties typically result in serious risk for the user in terms of . NBBJ helps clients drive innovation by creating highly productive, sustainable spaces that free people to live, learn, work and play as they were meant to.

The Design and Implementation of the Tor Browser [DRAFT]